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COMMITTEE EXPLORATORY
METHODS AND
TECHNIQUES *
FRANK

D.

EMERSON

"

Introduction.

MPETUS FOR CONGRESSIONAL investigation of proxy regulation developed principally from two immediate sources. One
originated in the interval between the proxy contest for the New
York Central Railroad in the spring of 1954 and the Montgomery
Ward & Company proxy contest of spring 1955, namely, with the filing
by Senator Homer E. Capehart on February 1, 1955 of Senate Bill
879 to amend section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The amendment proposed for section 16(a) would require reports to
the SEC of changes in beneficial ownership, not only, as at present, by
officers and directors of stock exchange listed companies, but also
by the beneficial owners of more than five per cent of the outstanding
equity securities of listed companies, instead of, as at present, merely
by those with more than ten per cent beneficial ownership.' While
neither the bill nor the Senator's press release make any reference to
section 14 of the Exchange Act dealing with proxies,2 it was presumably anticipated that, if the Senator's bill to amend section 16(a) of
the Exchange Act 3 should be passed, the SEC would then modify
its administrative regulations under section 14 of the act 4 so as to
require proxy statement disclosures when beneficial holdings of equity
securities exceed five per cent.'
The other, and doubtless principal, development pointing to a
congressional investigation of proxy regulation was Finding 12 of
* This article was prepared as a paper for a course in "Law and Politics: Congressional Investigations Seminar" given in the 1956 Summer Program for Law
Teachers at New York University School of Law by Sidney Davis, Esq., of the
New York Bar.
tProfessor of Law, University of Cincinnati; A.B., 1938, University of Akron;
LL.B., 1940, Western Reserve University; Kenneson Fellow, Summers 1955 & 1956,
and Candidate for J.S.D., New York University School of Law.
1. S. 879, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
2. Office of Senator Homer E. Capehart, Press Release, Feb. 1, 1955.
3. 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a) (1952).
4. 48 STAT. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78n (1952).
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a), 5(d) (Supp. 1955).
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the Senate's "Stock Market Study" released on May 27, 1955.0 The
finding quoted the blanket authority given the Securities and Exchange
Commission under section 14 to promulgate rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, and then referred to the
Capehart Bill's objective of requiring additional securities-ownership
disclosures regarding listed companies.' "This question," the study
declared, "together with the whole subject of modern methods of
corporate control, and effective corporate democracy, through the
exercise of the right to vote, share in importance." 8 A Subcommittee,
the Securities Subcommittee as a matter of fact, under the chairmanship
of Senator Herbert H. Lehman, the study concluded, "would shortly
hold public hearings on these subjects." 9
The purpose of this paper is to examine the methods and techniques
employed to date in the pending congressional investigation of proxy
regulation by Senator Lehman's Subcommittee, particularly the scope
and depth of the data presented in the statements submitted by the
witnesses called before the Subcommittee. It is proposed to consider
the data presented by the five 1955 witnesses and the six 1956 witnesses,
making in all a total to date of ten persons inasmuch as Chairman J.
Sinclair Armstrong of the SEC appeared as a witness in both 1955
and 1956. Attention will also be given to the proxy solicitation
statistics contained in a recent SEC report and supplemental schedules
filed by the SEC Chairman during May 1956 in connection with the
Fulbright Bill,' ° with the Securities Subcommittee's parent, the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency." In conclusion, various
suggestions regarding the direction and method of developing further
subcommittee data and recommendations will be offered.
I.
WITNESSES CALLED AND SCOPE OF THEIR STATEMENTS.

The five witnesses who were called and presented statements at
the hearings held on June 1, 8, 9, and 15, 1955 dealt almost exclusively

with proxy contests proper, rather than other aspects of proxy regula6. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Stock Market Study, S. REP.
[Committee Print], 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1955).

7. Ibid. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
8. See note 6 supra

9. Ibid.
10. S.2054, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
11. See SEC REPORT ON S. 2054 TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, at 4-9 (1956) ; Statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong on July 6, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956).
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tion. Four of the witnesses, Louis E. Wolfson, John A. Barr, Robert
R. Young, and William White, confined themselves either to their
own experience in the 1954 New York Central Railroad contest, the
1955 Montgomery Ward & Co. contest, or to legislation relating to
the broad matters of corporate control and corporate or shareholder
democracy.
SEC Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong confined his
testimony to proxy contests alone, making only the briefest passing
reference to what he characterized as "the thing called 'corporate
democracy,' " 12 and expressly directed himself to no specifically designated contests.'"
A. The 1955 Witnesses.
1. Louis E. Wolfson.14 At the outset Mr. Wolfson, the leader
of the opposition in the Montgomery Ward contest, affirmed that
proxy contests are wholesome, because, similar to public elections, they
serve to focus attention on the stewardship of those holding and
aspiring to office."3 In the interest of effective corporate democracy
he called for: (1) ownership of company's shares by officers and directors; (2) reasonable relationship between officers' salaries and the
company's earnings; (3) limitations on officers' and directors' pensions;
(4) fair dividend payments; and (5) corporate democracy through a
full voice for shareholders in management affairs without limitations
by use of the stagger system or the withholding of corporate
information.
Stock exchanges and government agencies, Mr. Wolfson asserted,
should: (1) require reports of all compensation to officers and directors by any company which has reduced or passed a dividend payment; and (2) admit a company's shares to listing only when it has
shown itself worthy of trust and its directors have demonstrated an
awareness of their role as shareholder trustees.
On the basis of his experience in the Montgomery Ward & Co.
proxy contest, Mr. Wolfson made the following suggestions regarding
tightening the SEC proxy regulation: (1) clarification of SEC powers
concerning proxy contest soliciting material, including pre-proxy
12. Statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong on June 15, 1955, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
13. Ibid.

14. Statement of Louis E. Wolfson on June 1, 1955, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1955), reported in Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1955, p.18, cols. 1-3; see also
Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1955, p. 16, cols 1-2.
.15.-To. the same .effect see EMERSON & LATqHAM, SHAREHOLDER D4MOCRACY: A
BROADER OUTLOOK. FOR CORPORATIONS. 69-70,. 138-44 (1954); and GLBFRT, D.VIDENDS
AND DEMocRAcy 139-180 (.1956).
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statement soliciting material; (2) simultaneous release of management
and non-management proxy statement soliciting material; (3) restriction on use of the annual report as a vehicle for soliciting material; (4)
full disclosure of all activities relating to proxy soliciting, including:
purchase of shares; use of employees, suppliers, institutions, and others
as proxy solicitors; amounts to be expended by both sides in the contest; and resignation of nominees; (5) prompt SEC clearance of news
releases and advertisements; (6) full information regarding nominees;
(7) availability of stock lists to bona fide shareholders acting in good
faith; ' and (8) clarification of SEC policy concerning press
conferences.
Regarding the broad matter of inter-corporate control, Mr.
Wolfson commented on: (1) disclosure of inter-company transactions;
(2) holdings of competitors' shares; (3) restrictions on use of unions'
shareholdings for bartering in connection with their collective bargaining.
7
2. John A. Barr.1
Mr. Barr, called of course, concerning th
management view of the Montgomery Ward contest, at once affirmed,
as had Mr. Wolfson, that there should be no limitation on the right of
shareholders to change the management, but insisted that there should
be protection against the sudden intrusion into management of "hidden"
financial interests. He then made specific reference to the circumstance that apparently "over 700,000 shares of Ward stock .
[were] owned by unnamed and unidentified members of the Wolfson
group." As his second point, Mr. Barr interposed an objection to
what he regarded as SEC censorship of proxy soliciting material.
Finally, he pointed out that the Capehart Bill "s would have had no
effect on the Montgomery Ward contest, even though it should reduce
the beneficial ownership reporting requirements from ten to five per
cent, because, as in many other large companies, no one owns even as
much as one per cent of Montgomery Ward common stock.
3. William White.'" Mr. White presented the management view
of the New York Central contest. In essence he took the same three
16. Cf. Emerson, The New Ohio General CorporationLaw: Some Comments and
Some Comparisons, 24 U. CiN. L. R v. 463, 491-93 (1955); Emerson, Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Corporation Law and the Model Act, 42 VA. L. Rzv. 489,
513-15 (1956). As to a suggestion for a state statutory provision for independent
inspectors of election, see id, at 516, 532. Representatives of the American Arbitration
Association have indicated that the proposed section is administratively feasible.
17. Statement of John A. Barr on June 1, 1955, HearingsBefore the Subcommittee
on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1955), reported in Wall Street Journal, June 2, 1955, p. 18, cols 1-3.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. Statement of William White on June 8, 1955, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1955), reported in Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1955, p. 22, cols. 1-2.
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positions as Mr. Barr of Montgomery Ward, and added that: (1)
beneficial owners of "street" shares should be required to send to the
contesting group they favored evidence of the authority of their broker
to vote the shares; and (2) "staggered" terms of directors should be
sanctioned and encouraged by law.
4. Robert R. Young. 20 Mr. Young, successful leader of the New
York Central opposition group, opened his testimony with an attack
on interlocking railroad and bank boards of directors. He followed
with six recommendations for encouraging share-ownership and emancipation of management from interlocks, to the betterment of competitive
enterprise: (1) provide a secret ballot for shareholders, but require
truth and full disclosure for contestants in proxy contests; (2) limit
the use of employees for proxy solicitation, and limit the use of corporate
funds to a "sum fixed in relation to past normal experience, until
approved by stockholders"; 21 (3) prohibit intervention of other corporations, their directors, officers, or employees in proxy contests; (4)
separate trust and commercial banking functions; (5) separate investment banking and brokerage firms from their affiliated investment
companies if the latter are owned by the public; and (6) prohibit interlocking directorates between banks, investment bankers, investment
companies, insurance companies, mutual savings banks, pension funds,
endowment funds and foundations with or through other large
corporations.
5. J. Sinclair Armstrong." SEC Chairman Armstrong, following introductory material regarding the SEC's statutory authority
and administrative procedures, commented on nine of the SEC's
more important problems in dealing with a proxy "contest for control."
The nine problems referred to were: (1) when does "solicitation" begin
in a proxy contest; (2) what constitutes "solicitation"; (3) what
standards shall govern the content of soliciting material, with particular
attention to: (a) pre-proxy statement soliciting material; and (b)
supplemental or post-proxy statement material; (4) what SEC action
is required when it appears that soliciting material is incomplete or
misleading; (5) disclosure of financial interests and motivation by
opposition groups; (6) character and reputation attacks; (7) methods,
20. Statement of Robert R. Young on June 9, 1955, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), reported in Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1955, p. 18, cols. 1-3.
21. See EMERSoN & LATCHAM, op. cit. supra note 15 at 142 concerning proportional reimbursement of insurgents, successful or unsuccessful.
22. See note 12 supra. See also Address by SEC Chairman Armstrong, New
England Group, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, June 1, 1955.
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strategy, and tactics of solicitation; (8) deals between opposing sides;
and (9) inclusion of soliciting material in the annual report.
. Among the various remedies for these problems the SEC Chairman proposed that: (1) the proxy rules should be clarified expressly
to permit pre-proxy statement solicitations, upon the conditions that:
(a) newly evolved "statements" ' be filed with the SEC incident to
proxy solicitation by "each member and associate of an opposition group
and each nominee"; (b) the proxy statement contain such of the
"proposed new statements" information as the SEC may by its rules
require; and that (2) no solicitation of more than ten persons by an
opposition group or by any management may begin, until the newly
to be prescribed "statements" had been filed with the SEC. In each
instance the suggested "statements" would be required to be filed by
each member, associate, and nominee concerning his identity, employment, business experience, stock ownership, date of acquisition, how
financed, how owned, corporate connections, and criminal record, if
any, for the preceding ten years. In addition to these two proposals,
the Chairman made reference to some eight others, most of which
would simply codify present and previously existing SEC administrative practice regarding proxy contests.
Summary.
From the synopsis descriptions of the 1955 witnesses' statements
to the Subcommittee it is apparent that, except for the SEC Chairman,
they confined themselves either to the New York Central or the
Montgomery Ward proxy contests or to general expressions of
opinion regarding the broad questions of corporate control and corporate or shareholder democracy. In both the New York Central
and the Montgomery Ward contests, it may be noted, there was
extensive use of pre-proxy statement soliciting material.
The SEC Chairman, on the other hand, limited himself to proxy
contests alone, but deliberately did not address himself to any particular
contests. Consequently, even if his suggestions for amendments of
the proxy regulation growing out of resort to pre-proxy statement
solicitation appear on the record developed by the Subcommittee
appropriate to contests such as those involving New York Central and
Montgomery Ward, they can only be properly applicable to all proxy
contests, if all contests are in all respects closely similar to the Central
23. The 1956 amendments to the SEC's proxy regulation designate the "statements" by the title "Schedule 14B." See SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 5276, 9-11 January 17, 1956.
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and Ward contests. To express the matter in somewhat different
words, the SEC Chairman's proposals for the later SEC-adopted
schedule 14B statements, even if appropriate in contests such as those
at Central and Ward, will be fairly applicable to all contests, only if
these two contests are typical of proxy contests generally.
The vital question here that, therefore, remains for investigation
by the Subcommittee is, are the Central and Ward proxy contests
typical? More specifically, why should schedule 14B "statements"
be required to be filed, irrespective of whether pre-proxy statement
soliciting material is disseminated? Why should such information
have to be duplicated in the schedule 14B "statement" and in the
proxy statement, particularly where there is no resort in a particular
contest to pre-proxy statement soliciting? In how many proxy
contests since December 31, 1952 has there been use of pre-proxy
statement soliciting material? In how many such contests has there
been no use of pre-proxy statement soliciting material? Do both
contests for representation and contests for control require schedule
14B statements, especially when no pre-proxy statement solicitation is
carried on?
B. The 1956 Witnesses.
1. A. Wilfred May. 4 Mr. May, financial columnist for the
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, with one exception, limited his
statement to a call for repeal of the 1954 limitations imposed by the
present SEC on the shareholder proposal rule. Besides urging equal
space for shareholder and management supporting statements relating
to shareholder proposals, instead of the present one hundred word
limitation' on shareholders, he requested: (1) that in view of the
declines in 1954, 1955 and 1956 in the number of shareholder proposals,
there should be abolished the requirement that for a stockholder
proposal to be resubmitted it must have received three per cent of the
total vote the first time it was submitted, and six and ten per cent
respectively, the next two times; (2) rescission of the four year ban on
shareholder proposals not drawing the three-six-ten per cent votes; and
(3) relief from omission of proposals on the ground that they relate
to the "conduct of the ordinary business operations." In closing his
statement Mr. May called for 'reimbursement of non-management
24. Statement of A. Wilfred May on July 5, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956), reported in New York Times, July 6, 1956, p. 28, col. 5. See also May,
Observations: Proxy Contests and Controversy. The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle, July 5, 1956, p. 5.
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groups' proxy contest expenses, possibly on the basis of the obtaining
of some minimum percentage of the vote less than fifty-one per cent. 28
2. Edward R. Aranow. 26 Mr. Aranow's law firm represented
the non-management group that conducted proxy contests for control
of Twin City Rapid Transit Co. in 1949, United Cigar-Whelan Stores,
Inc., in 1951, and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation in 1953,
and also the management of Decca Records, Inc., in 1954. As regards
six legal problems arising under the Exchange Act, he advocated
amendments to: (1) extend the proxy rules to other than listed
companies; (2) require management solicitation of proxies; (3) make
clear that private parties as well as the SEC have a right to judicial
enforcement of the proxy rules; (4) provide judicial review of SEC
action or refusal to act; (5) afford SEC authority to set aside an
election for violations of the proxy rules; and (6) empower state court
consideration of violations of the proxy rules.
With respect to the proxy rules themselves, Mr. Aranow suggested: (1) "easier" obtainment of a "copy of the stockholders' list";
(2) provision for bona fide compromise of proxy contests; 27 and (3)
filing and disclosure of more information regarding proxy contest
expenses. As a miscellaneous suggestion, he proposed that a study
be made of the effect on corporate elections of investments by union
pension funds in corporate securities.
3. Lewis D. Gilbert.28 Mr. Gilbert, America's leading minority
shareholder and author of the recent book Dividends and Democracy,
called for four reforms: (1) passing of the Fulbright Bill so as to
subject publicly-held over-the-counter companies to the proxy regulation
and other requirements of the Exchange Act; (2) amendment of the
Fulbright Bill so as to make it applicable to publicly-held banks; (3)
amendment of the Exchange Act to require management to solicit
proxies; and (4) senatorial investigation into the manner in which
25. Cf. note 21 supra.

26. Statement of Edward R. Aranow on July 5, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reported in Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1956, p. 3, col. 4. See
also Aranow and Einhorn, State Court Review of Corporate Elections, 56 COLUM. L.
REV. 155 (1956) ; Aranow and Einhorn, Corporate Proxy Contests: Enforcement of
SEC Proxy Rules by the Commission and Private Parties, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 875

(1956).
27. Cf. supra note 12 at 29-30 concerning disclosure in soliciting material of
"Deals between Opposing Sides."
28. Statement of Lewis D. Gilbert on July 5, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956), reported in Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1956, p. 3, col. 4.
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fiduciaries, pension funds, profit sharing plans, and investment trusts
and mutual funds are voting proxies for the shares they hold.2 9
4. Wilma Soss ° Mrs. Soss, President of the Federation of
Women Shareholders in American Business, Inc. urged, among other
things: (1) adoption of a secret ballot procedure; (2) study of
unmarked proxy practices; and (3) proportional voting of shares in
affiliated companies.
5. Abraham Weiner." Mr. Weiner presented the statement of
his partner, Henry Mayer, Esq., counsel for the AT & T independent
telephone unions. He attacked the 1954 amendments to the shareholder proposal rule, as had Mr. May, particularly the exclusion of
shareholders' pension. proposals on the ground of being within the
"conduct of the ordinary business operations" and their "galloping"
three-six-ten per cent resubmission requirement.
6. Leo Brady. 2 Mr. Brady, a partner in the New York City law
firm that represented the non-management group involved in the 1955
Libby, McNeill & Libby proxy contest, was concerned over purely legal
procedures relating to the granting of injunctions against proxy solicitation on a preliminary motion.'
7. J. Sinclair Armstrong.34 In addition to statements regarding
a pending new rule relating to broker-dealer nominee voting of customers' shares, the SEC Chairman stated that the new proxy contest
rules effective since January 1956 have been "working well" for
approximately a dozen proxy contests waged under them. The new
rules expressly pertain, among other things, to pre-proxy statement
solicitation, and require the filing of schedule 14B statements by any
"participant," irrespective of whether pre-proxy statement solicitations
29. See Emerson, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A System for. Shareholder
Checks and Corporate Balance, 9 THs ANALYsTs JOURNAL 87, 91-92 (1953) ; Emerson,
Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and Individual Participation
Under the SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. (Nov. 1956).
30. Statement of Wilma Soss on July 5, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956), reported in Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1956, p. 3, col. 4.
31. Statement of Abraham Weiner on July 6, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
32. Statement of Leo Brady on July 6, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1956).
33. See SEC v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y., 1955), 24 U. CIN. L. REv. 609
(1955).

34. Statement of J. Sinclair Armstrong on July 6, 1956, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1956), reported in Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1956, p. 12, cols. 2-3.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2: p. 75

are undertaken. 5 However, as in his testimony of a year earlier, no
specific supporting basis for the conclusions expressed was presented by
the SEC Chairman.
Summary.
There was testimony in 1956, as in 1955, with reference to
broad questions of corporate control and corporate and shareholder
democracy. Some of the suggestions would require at least amendments to the Exchange Act and others, perhaps, still further legislation.
In addition, two of the 1956 witnesses, Mr. May and Mr. Weiner,
called for rescission of the 1954 amendments to the shareholder proposal
rule. Moreover they supported their specific suggestions for repeal
with pertinent data bearing on the operation of. the 1954 amendments
to the shareholder proposal rule during 1954, 1955, and 1956.86
II.
SEC

REPORT TO THE SENATE BANKING AND
CURRENCY COMMITTEE.

While not actually a part of the record developed by the Securities
Subcommittee, there is readily available to it recent statistical data
relating to proxy regulation, for such material is contained in an SEC
report and supporting schedules filed with the parent Committee on
Banking and Currency in connection with the pending Fulbright Bill.8 7
The data covers: (1) non-solicitation of proxies by managements of
listed companies; (2) operation of the 1954 amendments to the shareholder proposal rule; and (3) proxy contests conducted during 1954,
1955, and 1956 to May 18.
As to non-solicitation, briefly, an SEC schedule shows that the
ratio of non-soliciting companies to soliciting companies in 1955 was
24.3 per cent " or approximately the same as it was in 1952. 89 Cor35. For comment on the new proxy contest rules, see Note, Securities and Exchange Commission Regulation of Proxy Contests, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1462 (1956);
Note, Increased Control over Proxy Contests, 44 GEo. L. REV. 285 (1956); Note,
Regulation of Proxy Contests by the SEC: The 1956 Amendments to Regulation X14,
24 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 687 (1956).
. 36. The supporting data presented by Mr. May and Mr. Weiner in their request
for repeal of the shareholder proposal rule's 1954 amendments substantially confirms
the serious doubts expressed regarding the amendments and the concern over their
adoption, as set out in Bayne, Caplin, Emerson & Latcham, Proxy Regulation and
the Rule Making Process: The 1954 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387, 427-429 (1954).
37. See SEC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 11;
38. SEC SCHEDULE, PROXY STATISTICS UNDER REGULATION X-14-CALENDAR
YEAR 1955, RATIO OF SOLICITING TO NON-SOLICITING COMPANIES-1934 ACT.
.39. EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A. BROADER OUTLOOK FOR
CORPORATIONS 48 (1954), citing 24% figure in speech by former SEC Commissioner,

Clarence Adams.
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rective steps would appear long overdue in order to bar non-solicitation
and partial solicitation.
Concerning shareholder proposals, the SEC's schedules show that
the number of shareholders whose proposals were carried in management proxies statements in both 1954 and 1955, thirty-one and thirtysix, respectively, in absolute terms was lower than the thirty-nine for
1953, the last year before the 1954 amendments to the shareholder
proposal rule became effective.4' Moreover, the number of management
proxy statements filed increased in both 1954 and 1955 to 1,846 and
1,973, respectively, from the 1,838 filed in 1953,41 with the result that,
although 2.1 per cent of the 1953 management proxy statements
carried shareholder proposals in 1953, only .9 per cent of both the
1954 and 1955 management proxy statements carried shareholder
proposals. In addition, excluded shareholder proposals increased in
1954 and 1955 to fifty-four and sixty-two,4 2 respectively, and neither
of these SEC figures takes into account still other proposals made
ineligible for presentation under the amended three-six-ten per cent
requirements for resubmission.'
Inasmuch as the number of proposals
submitted by the Gilberts increased in 1954 and 1955,44 it is apparent
that proposals submitted by individual shareholders necessarily de&creased in 1954 and 1955. These likely results of the 1954 amendments were urged to the present SEC in opposition to adoption of the
1954 amendments.45 It is now apparent on the basis of the SEC's own
figures that, as the witnesses May and Weiner asserted, the amendments have in effect operated harshly against the individual American
shareholder, and that it is entirely appropriate for the Subcommittee
to call for their prompt repeal by the SEC.4 6
While the SEC schedules on shareholder non-solicitation and the
shareholder proposal rule are clear enough as to their significance, the
data filed by the SEC with the Committee on Banking and Currency
concerning 1954, 1955, and 1956 proxy contests is superficial, and
should be further investigated by the Subcommittee. The schedule
40. SEC

SCHEDULE, NUMBER COMPANIES FILING PROXY STATEMENTS,

1954, 1955 AT 4.
41. Cf. id. at 1,4.
42. Ibid. See SEC

ETc.1953,

SCHEDULE, NUMBER OV STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS EXCLUDED

FROM MANAGEMENT PROXY STATEMENTS UNDER REGULATION X-14 OF THEICOMMISSION'S RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT Ol

1934.

43. Id. at 2. Cf. Bayne, Caplin, Emerson, and Latcham, supra note 36 at 427.
44. Ibid. See SEC SCHEDULES, STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS INCLUDED IN MANAGEMENT'S PROXY STATEMENTS UNDER THE COMMISSION'S X-14A-8 OF REGULATION X-14
UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE"AcT Or 1934 for (1) 1954, and (2)' 1955.
45. Bayne, Caplin, Emerson, and Latcham, supra note. 36 at 427-28.

46. Id. at 430-31.
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listing the companies involved in 1954 and 1955 proxy contests should
be extended to show, not merely whether the contest was for representation or for control and whether the management or the opposition
won, but, to the point of the 1956 amendments requiring schedule 14B
statements, the number of pieces of pre-proxy statement soliciting
literature filed by the management and the opposition of each of the
designated companies. This would also afford an indication as to
actual need for the filing of duplicate material in the schedule 14B
statements and in proxy statements.4 7
The schedule of companies involved in 1956 proxy contests should
also be extended to make more meaningful the column indicating the
number of persons filing as "participants" under schedule 14B.4" There
should be a showing of the number of management and the number of
opposition "participant" 40 persons filing schedule 14B statements.5"
In addition, there should be another column indicating the number of
pages of schedule 14B material filed by the management and the opposition participant persons, particularly since in one 1956 proxy contest
the opposition filed seventy-two pages of schedule 14B statements,
much of which had to be duplicated in the proxy statement of the
opposition. 51
III.
SUGGESTIONS
FURTHER

REGARDING

DIRECTION AND

SUBCOMMITTEE

DATA

AND

METHOD

OF DEVELOPING

RECOMMENDATIONS.

The matters regarding schedule 14B statements are of grave
importance to opposition groups, since the opposition is already placed
at a tremendous disadvantage as a consequence of the management
being able to draw on the corporate treasury for its proxy contest
52
expenses, while the opposition must provide or advance its own.
As the Wall Street Journal editorially said at the outset of the Subcommittee's hearings in 1955:
47. Compare new SEC Rule X-14A-11(c) and Schedule 14B with Schedule 14A,

Item 4(b), Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 5276 at 4, 8, 9-11 (Jan. 17,
1956), 21 FED. Rw. 577 (Jan. 26, 1956).
48. SEC SCHEDULE,

PRELIMINARY

REPORT ON COMPANIES FOR WHICH

STATE-

MENTS UNDER SCHEDULE 14B OF THE COMMISSION'S PROXY RULES WERE FILED IN
1956 CALENDAR YEAR UP TO MAY 18.
49. For the all-inclusive definition in the new rules of the term "participant", see
new rule X-14A-11(b).
50. Notes 55, 56 infra.
51. Emerson and Latcham, Law and the Future: A Symposium: Corporation
Law, 51 Nw.U. L. REv. 196, 202-03 (1956).
52. EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDERS DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK
FOR CORPORATIONS

71 (1954).
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"There is a little bit of suggestion in the very origin of these
hearings that some people are worried not so much about the way
proxy fights are fought as about the fact that they might turn
out 'badly'-that the equivalent of the political demagogue might
be persuasive with the stockholder-voters. The 'wrong' group
might win, to the detriment of the company and the stockholders
themselves.
"The implication in this is that maybe the Government ought
to do. something to make proxy fights a little more difficult as a
means of protecting the stockholders from marauders.
"We hope the hearings will not lead in this direction. For
though there is always a danger from marauders-men who are
not interested in long-term good management but just in power
or a quick good thing-it is not nearly so great as the danger of
hampering the stockholders' final recourse against management
policies of which they disapprove." "
For as the Wall Street Journal also recognized:
"In practice proxy fights are difficult enough as it is. They
can rarely get under way unless there is some reason for dissatisfaction on which the outside group can capitalize. To be
successful the outside group has many obstacles to overcome;
the incumbent management, unless, it has caused widespread
dissatisfaction, has the advantage of tradition and a proven record.
To add to the obstacles would only be to lessen the need for
managements to be concerned about the satisfaction of their
stockholders.
"And the satisfaction of the voters is, of course, the final
thing. In any election, public or private, the voters may vote in
the way other people think is foolish. But to deprive them of the
right to make the wrong decision is to deny them the right to
decide." "'
What has the investigating Subcommittee developed to date?
First, statistical data in the hands of the Subcommittee's parent Committee regarding the 1954, 1955, 1956 decline in use of the shareholder
proposal rule by individual shareholders confirms the opinions expressed in the statements by the witnesses, A. Wilfred May and
Abraham Weiner, Esq., and in the article in the May 1954 Virginia
Law Review that the 1954 amendments to the shareholder proposal
rule have operated restrictively against individual shareholders, and
should be repealed.
Second, a rather clear case has already been made by the SEC's
figures indicating a non-solicitation ratio of approximately twenty-five
53. Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1955, p. 10, cols. 1 & 2.

54. Ibid. For a journalistic account of nine major proxy contests, see IAm, FIcwr

FOR CONTROL (1956).
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per cent. They would seem strongly to suggest that here an early
amendment to the Exchange Act is needed, as it has been since 1952.
It is to be noted, however, that SEC Chairman Armstrong testified
on July 6, 1956 that an SEC study of the matter would be necessary.
Perhaps, the basis for the Chairman's reticence to recommend corrective
legislation forthwith should be inquired into by the Subcommittee.
This is a matter of importance for, as former SEC Commissioner
Adams pointed out in his 1953 speech at the Hot Springs, Virginia,
annual meeting of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc.:
"During 1952 there were 445 companies which filed no proxy
material with the Commission. This constituted 24% of all
companies having voting securities so registered. Of this number,
138 [or 31%: (138 -- 445 =

31%)] were nondividend-paying

companies and 23 were Canadian or Cuban companies." "
It is therefore obvious that not only have twenty-four per cent of the
companies subject to the SEC's proxy regulation been disenfranchising

their shareholders by non-solicitation, but that 31 per cent of the 24
per cent or about 7.5 per cent of all corporations subject to the proxy
regulation are hiding their non-dividend records behind a nonsoliciting policy thus perpetuating their own management position.
Moreover, since the non-soliciting figure in 1955 remained at twentyfive per cent, it seems likely that the incidence of non-dividends among
non-solicitors has continued as high as was noted in 1953. This
loophole should be plugged at once. 6
Thirdly, the SEC should be required by the Subcommittee to
extend the 1954, 1955, and 1956 proxy contest data-schedules, as
suggested above, and to develop all further relevant material as to the
asserted necessity for duplicating the 14B material :in the proxy
statement.57 Inasmuch as management enjoys, since the 1954 amendments, a $30,000 exclusion from each of several remuneration subitems of Item 7 of schedule 14A,58 consideration ought also be given
to increasing substantially the $500 solicitation-financing exclusion
provided by the 1956 amendments respecting participants who must

otherwise file schedule 14B statements.5
55. Address by Commissioner Clarence H. Adams, American Society of. Corporate
Secretaries, Inc., June 1, 1953. See note 39 supra.
56. For comment deploring the non-solicitation loophole, see GILBERT, DIVIDENDS
AND DEMOCRACY 222-25 (1956) ; EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
BROADER OUTLOOK POR CORPORATIONS 48-49 137, 138, 145, 167 (1954) ; Bayne, Around
and Beyond the SEC-The Defranchised Stockholder, 26 IND. L.J. 207 (1951).
57. See note 47 supra.

58. Schedule 14A, Item 7(a), (d), (f).
59. New SEC Rule X-14A-11(b)(4). See also X-14A-11(b)(5) which affords

no exclusion whatever based on dollar amounts involyed.
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If as a corollary to further probing regarding the unnecessary
burden posed by the new schedule 14B statements," the Subcommittee
desires to determine why there recently have been, not substantially more
proxy contests, 6' but proxy contests for substantially larger companies,
the Subcommittee, with little need for seeking further facts, might take
notice of the two publicly recorded phenomena. First, until the
appearance of the next to last volume of the Federal Supplement published in 1950, there was no reported case that realistically could be
regarded as any sort of explicit precedent for reimbursing even
successful opposition groups, and therefore almost. no one had the
courage to risk as relatively nominal a sum as upwards of $6,000,62
his health, and his career, as did John J. Smith, since 1950 president
of Sparks-Withington,o even for control of a medium or smaller-sized
publicly-held corporation. However, with the official reporting of the
Steinberg 4 case late in 1950 and the litigation that followed over the
Fairchildcase 65 it became increasingly apparent after 1950 and during
60. "While men in the financial position of Mr. [Leopold D.] Silberstein, Robert

R. Young, and Louis E. Wolfson can probably meet such requirements with little more
difficulty than corporate management, the position of the small stockholder who may
desire representation on or control of a corporate board is vastly different in terms
of time and money.
"These burdensome new proxy contest rules are especially unfortunate since recent
surveys of the few listed companies involved in proxy contests have established that
in most instances the corporations facing opposition solicitations suffered from decadent management. As a result the new rules protect decadent and ineffective management and deter shareholder activity as well. Further and broader objection involves
economic considerations. As corporations grow in size, maintenance of effective competition among them has become increasingly difficult. In addition, the entry of large
new firms, because of the amounts of capital needed, has been sharply reduced. The
proxy contest, because it may act to remove decadent management, can make new
'entries' possible by supplying established corporations with new management. A mitigation, by means of the proxy contest, of the dangers inherent in the lack of new
corporate entries would probably result in substantial benefits to society, the shareholder, and the public. Moreover, the possibility of a contest inspires incumbent management to more vigorous and faithful efforts. The weakening of the proxy rules is
therefore disappointing. The individual shareholder would plainly be benefited by more
representation in the administrative, as well as the legislative, process". Emerson &
Latcham, Law and the Future: A Symposium: Corporation Law, 51 Nw. U. L. REv.
196, 202-03 (1956).
61. The number of proxy contests has been declining steadily. In 1954 there were

22 such solicitations (See SEC

SCHEDULE, NoN-MANAGEMENT SOLICITATIONS UNDER

THE COMMISSION'S PROXY RULES INVOLVING THE ELECTION or DIRECTORS, CALENDAR
YEAR 1954), in 1955 18 such solicitations (See SEC SCHEDULE, NON-MANAGEMENT
SOLICITATIONS UNDER THE COMMISSION'S PROXY RULES INVOLVING THE ELECTION OF

DIREcTORS), and in 1956 to May 18, and therefore covering practically all of the 1956
proxy season, 14 such solicitations (See SEC SCHEDULE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON
COMPANIES

FOR WHICH

STATEMENT

UNDER

SCHEDULE

14B oF

THE COMMISSION'S

PROXY RULES WERE FILED IN THE 1956 CALENDAR YEAR UP TO MAY 18).
62. EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A BROADER OUTLOOK FOR

53 (1956).
63. Id. at 51-70.
64. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y., 1950).
65. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp., 116 N.Y.S. 2d 840 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 273 (2d Dep't 1954), aff'd, 309
N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 2d 291 (1955).
CORPORATIONS
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the first half of 1954 that insurgents' proxy contests expenses could
be recovered if they were successful.6" Considered in this perspective
it is not surprising to find that as a matter of fact a principal feature
of the 1954 "proxy season" was the substantially larger size of the
companies involved in proxy contests. 6 T As a result, even though contrary to popular opinion, there was' an actual decline in the number
of companies involved in proxy contests in 1953 and 1954,68 the total
assets of companies experiencing proxy contest increased in those
years, and so did the total sales figures for the reduced number of
companies.69 With proxy contest expenses recoverable, more money
could be ventured and larger companies sought. It is believed that
a survey currently underway will clearly show that this trend to proxy
contests for larger companies continued during 1955 and 1956 to date.7"
A second relevant question at this point for Subcommittee consideration is: how is it that with prospects for recovery of insurgents'
expenses only if the contest is won, insurgents, since the initial publicity
early in 1954 regarding the Fairchildcase, have been willing to expend
such huge sums in proxy contests, ranging up to the more than the
one million dollars spent by Robert R. Young and his associates in
the New York Central contest of 1954? The answer is to be found
in: (1) new technique employed in proxy contests since early 1954
with increasing frequency, namely, the insurgents' purchase of blocks
of shares of the company involved as well as the solicitation of
proxies; 7' (2) the circumstance that, due to the almost invariable
presence of "decadent management" 72 which was either ousted or
roused by the contest, the market price of the company's stock almost
invariably went up after the contest;73 and finally, (3) that the
purchased stock could therefore be resold and at profits subject to the
often lower capital gains, rather than the frequently higher ordinary
66. Ibid.
67. Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Contests: Competition for Management
Through Proxy Solicitation, 8 Sw. L.J. 403, 406 (1954).
68. See note 61, supra.
69. Emerson and Latcham, Proxy Contests: Competition for Management
Through Proxy Solicitation, 8 Sw. L.J. 403, 406-07 (1954).
70. The writer and his colleague are currently surveying in detail 1954, 1955, and
1956 proxy contest with a view to publishing the results in an article which will be
ready for publication early in 1957.
71. The technique of purchasing shares in conjunction with and independently
of proxy contests is referred to in Saunders, How Managements Get Tipped Over,
Fortune, Oct., 1955, p. 123.
72. See note 60 supra.

73. "I can't think offhand where the stockholder was not better off, in dividend

yield or in market value, after the fight than he was before." Perham, Revolt of the
Stockholder, Barron's, April 26, 1954, p. 3.
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income, income tax rates.74 Even if one was not able to earn both
control and capital gains as Mr. Young did by winning the New York
Central, he might as Mr. Wolfson could, even though he lost the Montgomery Ward contest, still pay his proxy contest expenses out of his
capital gains on the Montgomery Ward stock he and his group had
purchased and still hold a tidy profit. As a result, even when the
"battle by proxy" is lost, the stock purchase "war" may be won.
Under these circumstances the real wonder is indeed that there are
75
so few, not as some seem or purport to think, so many proxy contests.
As this consequence of the capital gains tax very substantially helps
to offset the proxy contest disadvantages of insurgents, as compared
to management, it provides at least one argument for retention of the
present capital gains tax differential rates.
Except in the three areas relating to the proxy regulation, the
data so far developed by the Subcommittee has provided only leads,
though important ones, for further detailed study and investigation.
But not to be overlooked are the many valuable suggestions made by
the subcommittee witnesses with a view to extending generally freedom
from the yoke of corporate control and encouragement of the development of corporate or shareholder democracy. While the suggestions
received by the investigating Subcommittee may by some be thought
of as witnesses' "speech-making," many of the suggestions warrant
careful attention. Moreover, in the area of administrative law most
closely allied to the field of congressional investigations, the quasilegislative technique of "rule-making," 71 "speech-making" is a recognized helpful procedure.77 However, thoughtful consideration of
these broader outlooks will entail, as suggested by certain of the
witnesses, a number of important and detailed "studies," 78 and conferences, 79 as well as further public hearings.
74. Cf. INT. REV. CODE oP 1954 §§ 1, 2, relating to individuals and joint returns as to
ordinary income, and INT. REv. CODE ov 1954, §§ 1201-41, pertaining to capital gains.
75. "What surprises me, in view of how easy it is to start a proxy fight these
days, is not how many there are, but how few." Perham, note 73, supra, quoting Mr.
George R. Squires of Squires & Co., a proxy soliciting firm.
76. As to rule-making generally, see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 229-72 (1951).
As to proxy rule-making, in the instance of the 1954 amendments to the shareholders
proposal rule, see Bayne, Caplin, Emerson, and Latcham, note 36 supra.
77. The "speech-making" technique in administrative rule-making is discussed
in DAVIS op. cit. supra note 76, at 238-40.
78. For a description of a "study technique," which may precede or at least partially substitute for expensive and extensive public hearings, namely, use of research
techniques normally used by industry and government, see statement of Roscoe L.
Barrow on June 27, 1956, Hearings Before the House Judiciary Anti-Trust Subcom-

mittee, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 15-16 (1956).
79. As to the conference technique, see DAvIS op. cit. supra note 76 at 238-40, and
Statement of Roscoe L. Barrow, note 78 supra at 16-18.
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It should be noted that following the close of the taking of the
testimony of the 1956 witnesses early in July it was reported, apparently
on the advice of the Subcommittee, that the parent Senate Banking
and Currency Committee had decided in effect to delay consideration
of proxy contests' legislation until next year. The parent committee
also reportedly voted to defer consideration of any legislation until
after replies have been received to a large number of questions directed
to the SEC, and not expected to be returned by the SEC to the
Subcommittee until late in 1956.0 It may be hoped that included in
the questionnaires, or to be included in supplemental questionnaires,
are probing inquiries regarding the universal need implicit in the
SEC's new 1956 proxy contest rules for schedule 14B statements and
concerning the basis for further delay in closing the non-solicitation
and partial solicitation loophole. It is also to be noted that, about
ten days after the appearance of the item regarding the deferring of
further legislative consideration, it was reported that Chairman Lehman
of the Securities Subcommittee had asked his staff to make a study
of corporate proxy practices and other methods used to acquire control
of publicly-held corporations. 8' This, it may also be hoped, is to be
only a brief excursion from the larger and more immediate tasks
already sketched, for it tends to confirm the Wall Street Journal's
fears of June 1955 that the inquiry might proceed on the theory that
''maybe the Government ought to do something to make proxy fights
a little more difficult as a means of protecting the stockholders from
marauders." 8
Whatever may be the future direction and emphasis of the
Securities Subcommittee inquiries and recommendations that lie ahead,
the Subcommittee is definitely to be commended for not permitting
itself to be diverted to corporate witch-hunting in quest of corporate
subversives. Similar restraint, however, has not been exercised by
other committees. Under questioning by Senator Olin D. Johnston at
a July, 1956 hearing of the Senate Post Office Committee, SEC Chairman Armstrong stated that "[I]t is possible investment capital from
behind the Iron Curtain may be coming secretly into the United States
for investment in American concerns," and Chairman Armstrong
indicated, too, "the possibility that Iron Curtain investors might, by
proxy, get directors of their choice on United States corporations." 8
Less than a week later "Mr. Leopold D. Silberstein, New York
80. Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1956, p. 7, col. 3.
81. Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1956, p. 6, col. 4.

82? See note 53supra."
83. Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1956,' p. '5, col. 3-4.
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financier, and two of his associates in the Penn-Texas Corporation"
were "subpoenaed to appear before" another congressional investigating committee, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee investigating
foreign investments in United States corporations. A Subcommittee
spokesman said, "the senators wanted to question the German-born
Mr. Silberstein, now a United States citizen, about foreign capital held
in the name of Swiss banks and allegedly used in Penn-Texas
efforts to gain control of other United States enterprises." 14 Mr.
Silberstein promptly issued the following statement:
"The committee informed me four weeks ago that I am one
of thirty or forty American businessmen scheduled to be called
upon for such information as might be of aid to the Committee.
I expect that the Committee will want all the information at my
disposal concerning the controlling holding of Canadian FairbanksMorse and Company of Chicago in which the Penn-Texas Corporation has a very substantial interest." 85
While there have been no further reports as to what the Internal
Security Subcommittee has developed, past ventures in search of
political subversives are not an encouraging background against which
to ponder the prospects for hunting down corporate subversives. Indeed, to go back some years ago, the experience of a congressional
committee of ten to twenty-five years ago in investigating the activities
of the Amtorg Trading Corporation affords even less comfort for
useful results."6 In any event, since the Internal Security Subcommittee
has pre-empted the field there would seem to be no reason why the
Securities Subcommittee should indulge itself in such forays.
CONCLUSION.

It appears in summary that to date in the areas of corporate
control and shareholder and corporate democracy, the work of the
Subcommittee has been to a considerable extent exploratory, though
with excellent preliminary results. It is now time, however, to undertake: (1) recommendations based on specific data at hand regarding:
84. Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1956, p. 7, col. 3. Earlier in 1956 in connection
with another attack on Mr. Silberstein, Senator Wayne Morse said he believed "the
attack on L. D. Silberstein is totally unwarranted," that Mr. Silberstein had been
"bitterly and publicly denounced as a raider" because of his efforts to seek representation on the board of Fairbanks, Morse & Co." See Wall Street Journal, Feb. 20,
1956, p. 3, col. 3.
85. Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1956, p. 7, col. 3.
86. For comment on and references to the Amtorg Trading Corp. investigation,
see Massey, Congressional Investigations and Individual Liberties, 25 U. GIN. L. REv.
323, 327 (1956).
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(a) legislative corrections concerning non-solicitation and partial
solicitations; and (b) SEC repeal of the 1954 amendments to the shareholder proposal rule; and (2) prompt study of detail on the extent of
use in proxy contests of pre-proxy statement soliciting material and
duplicate schedule 14B data. After and only after, these matters have
been completed, should study of the other indicated aspects of corporate
control and corporate or shareholder democracy be commenced.
The interests and rights of the country's more than 8Y million
direct shareholders, a figure that amounts to 5.2 per cent of our July
1, 1955 estimated population and that reflects a 33 per cent increase in
the number of shareholders since 1952,7 require immediate action
wherever it is possible, and, where it is not, careful study to determine
what further legislation or recommendations to administrative agencies
may be necessary for the protection of investors or in the public
interest.88

It one roughly calculates the interests of the nation's

indirect shareholders, namely, our bank depositors, our insurance
policy holders, annuitants, and pensioners, and others with secondary
interests in portfolio securities at, say, double the number of direct
holders, or ten per cent, and adds the five per cent direct share ownership, fully fifteen per cent of our population, or about twenty-five
million Americans, have more or less immediate investor interest
alone.8" Add to this the public interest, and clearly the matters here
discussed, have significance.
87. Wall Street Journal, July 24, 1956, p. 19, cols. 5 & 6.
88. See note 4 supra.
89. This "10%" calculation of the number of indirect shareholders, does not
really even qualify as being "rough." It is ridiculously modest, bearing only infinitesimal resemblance to either economic or statistical reality, and at best is merely stimulating. For example, the total number of life insurance policies alone in force in the
United States in 1955 was 251,089,000. 1956 Life Insurance Fact Book, 1956, p. 10.
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